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Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since 
they must choose whether or not to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in 
advisory contexts, knowing that their decisions hold significant consequences for 
animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the moral 
consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is 
lacking. Through reflection on two cases—the case of pain, and the case of cognitive 
enrichment—I arrive at a tentative general framework based on the principle of 
expected welfare maximization. I then discuss the limitations of this framework and 
the important questions it leaves open. 
 
 
1. Inductive risk in the science of animal welfare 
The interface of animal cognition research and animal welfare policy presents an important 
context in which to examine the role that ethical value-judgments should, or should not, play 
in the scientific process. The scientists who work at this interface—animal welfare 
scientists—have a dual role. On the one hand, they are practising scientists, seeking to 
advance our knowledge of animal welfare. On the other hand, they serve as expert advisors, 
shaping policy in ways that promote improved welfare for domesticated and captive animals. 
Good animal welfare policy should be sensitive to the needs and interests of animals; but, 
since animals cannot speak for themselves, the task of representing their needs and interests 
to policymakers usually falls to animal welfare experts.1 
 
For a concrete example, consider the 2010 European Union (EU) directive on the protection 
of animals used for scientific purposes, which extended to cephalopod molluscs (such as 
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octopuses, squid and cuttlefish) the same regulatory framework that previously applied only 
to vertebrates. This directive was based on a 2005 report prepared by an advisory board of 
animal welfare scientists, drawing on the latest animal cognition research (AHAW 2005). 
The report had recommended extending protection to cephalopod molluscs and decapod 
crustaceans (such as crabs, lobsters and crayfish). However, following consultation with the 
EU member states, the recommendation regarding cephalopods was implemented, but the 
recommendation regarding decapods was not. 
 
Because the animal welfare scientist is, and should be, both a scientist and a policy advisor, 
matters of ethical concern enter into the practice of animal welfare science in several ways. 
First, animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of “inductive risk” 
(Rudner 1953; Douglas 2000, 2009), since they must choose whether to affirm or reject 
uncertain hypotheses about the mental capacities of animals, knowing that their decisions 
may hold significant consequences for animal welfare. Second, they face the challenge of 
transforming value-laden concepts, such as welfare, suffering and personhood, into objective 
and empirically measurable quantities. Third, they face questions of how to revise their own 
practices in the light of the ethical consequences of the discoveries they make. 
 
This paper focusses primarily on the first issue—the problem of inductive risk. My concern is 
with the version of that problem that arises in the specific context of attributing mental states 
to animals. In general, one takes an inductive risk when one affirms or rejects a hypothesis 
that is uncertain, creating a risk of error. It is common to distinguish two types of error: a 
“Type I error” (or “false positive”), which involves the incorrect rejection of a true null 
hypothesis, and a “Type II error” (or “false negative”), which involves a failure to reject a 
false null hypothesis. These terms originated in the context of a particular statistical 
methodology—significance testing—but they have come to acquire a broader meaning, and 
are often applied in contexts where the null hypothesis is characterized qualitatively rather 
than statistically (the modern usage of the terms “false positive” and “false negative” is 
especially broad). I consider this broader, more informal usage harmless and will make use of 
it here.  
 
In general, scientists tend to prioritize the avoidance of false positives, on the grounds that 
erroneously affirming a falsehood is worse than failing to affirm a truth. I suspect this stems 
from a general virtue of epistemic caution, or epistemic modesty; it is epistemically virtuous 
to avoid affirming falsehoods. In animal cognition research, the (qualitative) null hypothesis 
is usually the absence of the mental phenomenon of interest in the species of interest. False 
positives are thus errors of over-attribution, whereas false negatives are errors of under-
attribution. Animal cognition researchers, in line with the epistemic caution of scientists in 
general, tend to prioritize the avoidance of errors of over-attribution. This is an idea famously 
captured in Lloyd Morgan’s canon, a principle that has long been a source of debate and 
controversy among philosophers of biology (Morgan 1894; Allen-Hermanson 2005; Sober 






Errors of over-attribution are often described as errors of anthropomorphism, and Morgan’s 
canon is often interpreted as an imperative to prioritize avoiding such errors. More recently, 
others have described errors of under-attribution as errors of “anthropodenial” (De Waal 
1999) or, more elegantly, “anthropectomy” (Andrews and Huss 2014). I avoid all of this 
terminology here; I will talk simply of over-attribution and under-attribution. Over-attribution 
may involve anthropomorphism but need not do so, and there may be forms of 
anthropomorphism other than over-attribution (see Section 6). Likewise, under-attribution 
may involve anthropectomy but need not do so, and anthropectomy too may come in other 
forms. 
 
Perhaps there are contexts far removed from policy applications in which it is generally 
appropriate to set the burden of proof so as to prioritize avoiding errors of over-attribution. I 
take no stand on this. But when there are clear policy applications in view, I contend that it is 
not appropriate. For I contend that, when animal cognition research directly informs animal 
welfare regulations, a special context is created in which erroneously affirming a false mental 
state attribution may be a less serious error, all things considered, than failing to affirm a true 
attribution. The decision of whether to affirm a mental state attribution for the purpose of 
formulating animal welfare policy requires consideration of the moral consequences of error, 
and in this sense animal welfare science resembles the various policy-related areas of science 
discussed by Douglas (2009).  
 
For this reason, and in contrast to animal cognition researchers working in less applied areas, 
few animal welfare scientists explicitly endorse Morgan’s canon. The prevailing view is 
rather that an appropriate balance must be struck between tolerance of errors of over-
attribution and tolerance of errors of under-attribution. However, a systematic framework for 
setting appropriate burdens of proof in animal welfare science is lacking. My aim in the rest 
of this paper is to take some initial steps towards the construction of such a framework by 
reflecting on two case studies: the case of pain, and the case of cognitive enrichment. 
 
2. Risks of under-attribution: the case of pain 
The full taxonomic range of the capacity to feel pain is unknown. Fiercely contested cases 
include fish (including bony, cartilaginous and jawless fish), arthropods (including 
crustaceans and insects) and molluscs (including cephalopods and gastropods). For each of 
these taxa, one finds some evidence in favour of pain, but one also finds sceptical critiques of 
the evidence. I will not survey the empirical literature on this issue here, rich and fascinating 
though it is (e.g. Bateson 1991; Allen 2004, 2013; Sneddon et al. 2014; Adamo 2016). I 
simply want to argue that this is a case in which the role of ethical considerations in setting 
an appropriate burden of proof seems relatively straightforward. For I take the following to 
be uncontroversial: to formulate animal welfare regulations on the assumption that animals of 
species S do not feel pain, when in fact animals of species S do feel pain, creates a risk of 






For example, to exempt a cephalopod species from regulations regarding scientific 
experimentation, on the grounds that cephalopods do not feel pain, creates a risk of serious 
negative consequences for their welfare if it is in fact the case that they do feel pain. This is 
because it would allow these animals to be subjected, legally, to prolonged and intense pain, 
such as the pain caused by the removal of limbs without anaesthetic. I do not need to commit 
to any particular definition of welfare to make this claim, because I take it to be a constraint 
on any reasonable definition that it will respect the obvious relationship between prolonged, 
intense pain and negative welfare (the question of how to define welfare will be touched 
upon, briefly, in Section 6). By contrast, I contend that to formulate animal welfare 
regulations for S on the assumption that organisms belonging to S do feel pain, when in fact 
they do not, would not create a risk of serious negative consequences for animal welfare. 
 
Given this asymmetry of risk between under-attribution and over-attribution, it is appropriate 
for animal welfare scientists to prioritize the avoidance of errors of under-attribution when 
attributing pain, at least when advising on animal welfare policy. One attractive way to do 
this is to adopt the following principle: 
 
(1) In the context of advising on animal welfare policy, an animal welfare scientist 
should affirm the hypothesis that pain is felt by organisms of species S whenever 
there is credible scientific evidence that pain is felt by organisms of S, even if that 
evidence is inconclusive and subject to continuing debate. 
 
A number of animal welfare scientists have advocated versions of this view, and have noted 
its close relationship to the “precautionary principle” (Bradshaw 1998; P. Andrews 2011; 
Sneddon et al. 2014). For example, credible scientific evidence in this context might take the 
form of experiments showing the self-delivery of analgesics, whereby the animal learns to 
administer pain relief drugs such as opioids in an operant conditioning setup; motivational 
trade-offs, whereby the animal behaves as if weighing its preference to avoid pain against 
other preferences; or conditioned place avoidance, whereby the animal learns to avoid 
locations at which it previously encountered noxious stimuli (Sneddon et al. 2014). No one 
would argue that these behaviours conclusively indicate pain; but they make it credible that 
pain is experienced. 
 
In many cases, however, the above principle is arguably not “precautionary” enough, because 
the number of species in contested taxa for which we have any relevant evidence at all is 
remarkably small. I have argued in previous work that a more practical approach is to take 
the order rather than the species as the appropriate level of analysis, and to affirm the 
hypothesis that pain is felt by organisms of a given order O whenever there is credible 
scientific evidence that pain is felt by organisms of any species within O (Birch 2017). For 
example, evidence of pain in a single species of decapod crustacean should be deemed 
sufficient for extending protection to the entire order of decapod crustaceans: we should not 






Here I want to consider the extent to which this reasoning generalizes to other mental states. 
Setting aside the question of whether the species is the right level of analysis, one might hope 
to generalize Principle (1) by adopting a principle of the following form: 
 
(2) For any mental state M, under-attributing M creates far more serious risks of 
negative animal welfare outcomes than over-attributing M. So, in the context of 
advising on animal welfare policy, an animal welfare scientist should affirm the 
hypothesis that organisms of species S have M whenever there is credible scientific 
evidence that organisms of S have M, even if that evidence is inconclusive and subject 
to continuing debate. 
 
In broad terms, Principle (2) is the inverse of Morgan’s canon: when in doubt, err on the side 
of over-attributing mental states. I suggest, however, that although this general anti-canon 
may seem attractive at first sight, it oversimplifies a complex issue. In reality, the relative 
seriousness of over- and under-attribution depends on the species, mental state and animal 
welfare intervention in question. Consideration of a second case—the case of cognitive 
enrichment—will help us see why. 
 
3. Risks of over-attribution: the case of cognitive enrichment 
An important tool for promoting the welfare of captive or domesticated animals is 
environmental enrichment, which aims at creating opportunities for such animals to express 
behaviours they would express in the wild, stimulating brain activity and alleviating 
boredom. A subset of environmental enrichments, known in the animal welfare literature as 
cognitive enrichments, exploit animal cognition research so as to provide animals with 
challenges that allow them to exercise their cognitive abilities more fully, and that enable 
them to exert control over aspects of their environment (Meehan and Mench 2007).  
 
What counts as a cognitive enrichment for a particular animal depends on the cognitive 
capacities of that animal, and there must be a close match between cognitive ability and 
environmental design. A challenge that is so difficult as to induce stress or anxiety is not an 
enrichment; a challenge so easy as to induce boredom or apathy is no enrichment either 
(Meehan and Mench 2007). Thus animal cognition research feeds directly into the design of 
appropriate cognitive enrichments. 
  
This creates risks of over-attribution. For example, there is tentative evidence that cows, 
when presented with simple operant conditioning tasks, enjoy the experience of learning new 
skills. A study by Hagen and Broom (2004) involved measuring the heart rate of cows as they 
confronted a task that involved pushing a button to open a gate, leading to food. Learning 
how to solve the puzzle for the first time, or how to solve it more quickly, was predictive of 
increased heart rate, an effect that was not present in cattle who had already learned how to 
solve the puzzle, or in those who had not yet solved it. This, Hagen and Broom argue, 





moreover—since heart rate is taken to be an indicator of affective arousal—some evidence 
that this experience alleviates boredom. Similar studies have been carried out on pigs and 
goats, with similar results (Puppe et al. 2007; Langbein et al. 2009; Zebunke et al. 2011). 
This indicates that operant conditioning tasks may constitute a valuable form of cognitive 
enrichment for farm animals (Manteuffel et al. 2009).  
 
Yet, for many reasons, this evidence is clearly inconclusive. The cause of increased heart rate 
may have been something other than a recognition that the puzzle had been solved.  Increased 
heart rate may not have been indicative of affective arousal at all. The affective arousal in 
question may have had a negative rather than a positive valence: that is, the animals might 
have felt frustrated or anxious rather than excited and pleased (there were no other signs that 
this was the case, but the evidence does not rule it out). The individuals or breeds in the 
sample may not be representative of other individuals or other breeds. The sample may 
simply have been too small. Jumping too quickly to the conclusion that operant conditioning 
tasks generate positive welfare, and recommending this form of welfare intervention 
prematurely, creates a risk of causing unnecessary stress to individuals who cannot solve the 
puzzles, or who gain no benefit from solving them. There might also be opportunity costs, if 
ineffectual environmental enrichments were to be recommended at the expense of simpler, 
more effective ones. 
 
Hence it is appropriate here to proceed with caution, and to require more than the mere 
existence of credible scientific evidence that cows enjoy puzzle solving before advising the 
implementation, in farms or zoos, of enrichments premised on their possession of that ability. 
Hagen and Broom (2004, 212) implicitly acknowledge this, writing that “because of the 
novelty of the approach and the small number of animals, this study should be seen as a first 
step towards further investigation of the topic”, despite quoting a high level of statistical 
significance (a p-value of 0.009) on the key result. 
 
In general, it seems appropriate to require more than the mere existence of credible scientific 
evidence that an organism possesses a cognitive ability before recommending an enrichment 
premised on its possession of that ability. The context of designing enrichments to alleviate 
boredom is very different from that of devising regulations to minimize animal pain, and a 
different burden of proof is appropriate. We should therefore reject Principle (2). 
 
4. Varying the burden of proof: a starting point 
Can a general framework accommodate the considerations raised by the foregoing cases? I 
will now sketch, tentatively, what such a framework might look like, before proceeding to 
discuss some limitations and unresolved issues. An attractive framework for setting burdens 
of proof, I suggest, is an expected welfare maximization framework based on the following 
overarching principle: the burden of proof for affirming a mental state attribution, in the 
context of advising on animal welfare policy, should be set so as to maximize the expected 






Why include only non-human animals? Why do the consequences of error for human well-
being not merit consideration when setting the burden of proof? This exclusion is justified on 
the grounds that the role of the animal welfare expert in advisory contexts is to act as a 
representative for the needs and interests of non-human animals. In a sound policymaking 
process, the needs and interests of humans are already well represented by policymakers and 
representatives of relevant sectors. If animal welfare scientists were also to factor in effects 
on humans, these effects would be double-counted. For example, in the consultative process 
that led to the 2010 EU directive on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, the 
UK Bioscience Sector (2009) pushed hard for various concessions, including the exclusion of 
decapods. If the AHAW (2005) panel had already taken due account of their concerns when 
judging whether to affirm that decapods feel pain, these concerns would have been double-
counted. At this stage in the process, it was appropriate to ignore them. 
 
Given this overarching principle, we can describe the animal welfare scientist’s decision 
problem as follows. Suppose an animal welfare scientist X must choose, in a policy context 
P, whether or not to affirm the hypothesis that species S has mental state M. This might, for 
example, be the hypothesis that a cephalopod or decapod species feels pain, in the context of 
formulating a set of regulations for laboratory research. There are four possible outcomes 
(Table 1): a correct attribution (A), a correct non-attribution (D), an error of over-attribution 











Let W represent the total welfare of the non-human animals affected by the policy to be 
formulated in P. The introduction of such a variable presupposes that we can measure welfare 
quantitatively, and that there is a way of aggregating the welfare of many individual animals, 
which may mean aggregating over individuals of many different species (e.g. all 
cephalopods). These presuppositions merit substantive debate in their own right; some might 
object that comparing welfare across species is to compare apples with oranges. But I am 
presupposing the possibility of an overall welfare measure here in order to think about how 
we should set the burden of proof for mental state attributions, on the assumption that there 
exists such a measure (I revisit some of the unresolved issues here in the final section). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 X affirms in P that S has 
M 
X does not affirm in P 
that S has M. 
S has M A B 





By the principle of expected welfare maximization, X should accept in P the hypothesis that S 
has M if and only if:  
 
E (W | K & X accepts in P that S has M) > E (W | K & X does not accept in P that S 
has M) 
 
Here K denotes the scientist’s relevant background knowledge, and the E (“expectation”) 
operator takes a weighted sum of the possible welfare outcomes, with each outcome weighted 
by its conditional probability given the scientist’s background knowledge and her decision as 
to whether or not affirm the hypothesis.  
 
On the assumption that X’s affirmation or non-affirmation of the hypothesis makes no 
difference to the conditional probability (relative to K) that the hypothesis is correct, this can 
be rearranged to yield the following, potentially more useful criterion (where Pr denotes 
probability): 
 
Pr (S has M | K) / Pr (S lacks M | K) > [W(C) – W(D)] / [W(B) – W(A)] 
 
The above criterion shows how the burden of proof should vary, in a context-sensitive way, 
with the relative seriousness of a false positive and a false negative. For every S, M and P, 
there is some critical probability that warrants affirming in P that S has M, but the critical 
probability depends on the details of the case. For example, when M is pain, S is an animal 
widely used in laboratory research, and P is the formulation of regulations for such research, 
the critical probability will be low, because an error of under-attribution is likely to be far 
more serious than an error of over-attribution. When M is the capacity to recognize that one 
has learned a new skill, S is a farm animal, and P is the recommendation of a cognitive 
enrichment that would yield no benefit in the absence of M, the critical probability will be 
substantially higher. 
 
5. Jeffrey’s objection 
In the 1950s literature on inductive risk, Jeffrey’s (1956) well-known objection to Rudner 
(1953) was that most scientists, in practice, are not in a position to assign utilities to 
outcomes such as A, B, C and D, because the wider social consequences of affirming or 
rejecting hypotheses are usually unforeseeable. Moreover, in cases where they are 
foreseeable, it seems as though lawmakers and voters—not unaccountable scientists—should 
make the relevant value-judgements. We can see now why animal welfare science constitutes 
a special context in which these objections are not compelling.  
 
First, we can give greater substance to the notion of utility by defining it, in this context, as 
the total welfare of the affected non-human animals. As noted above, this brackets the 
difficult issue of how welfare is to be measured, and how cross-species comparisons are to be 





welfare can indeed be measured, this is not an unreasonable presupposition for my purposes 
(though see Section 6).  
 
Second, by noting that affirmation is not affirmation simpliciter but affirmation in a specific 
advisory context, we can single out a particular causal path from a mental state attribution to 
welfare consequences that makes it feasible to evaluate the comparative severity of over-
attribution and under-attribution, relative to that context. In some cases, such as the case of 
pain, the welfare consequences of error are readily foreseeable. In other cases, such as the 
case of cognitive enrichment, the welfare consequences of error are complex and open to 
debate, sometimes requiring further investigation in their own right, but they are far from 
wholly unforeseeable, and they can and should be investigated empirically.  
 
Third, we can see that it is animal welfare scientists, and not politicians or voters, who are 
typically best placed to evaluate the seriousness of the different types of error. In other 
contexts, the individuals affected by a policy decision, or their elected representatives, may 
be better placed to make the relevant ethical value-judgements (cf. Kitcher 2002, 2011). But 
the context of animal welfare science is one in which the affected individuals cannot speak 
for themselves (Kitcher 2015). It falls to the animal welfare scientist, qua policy advisor, to 
give due weight to negative welfare consequences of over- or under-attribution. 
 
6. Limitations, open questions and future directions 
I suspect animal welfare scientists tacitly recognize many of these points; the role for 
philosophers of science is to clarify, systematize and defend the role that value-judgements 
already play in this field. But I hope to have shown that this is not a trivial task. Reflection on 
the case of pain shows very clearly that ethical concerns are relevant to the burden of proof, 
but reflection on other cases shows the relationship to be more subtle than it may first appear. 
The above sketch of an expected welfare maximization framework provides a tentative way 
forward, but it also draws our attention to two important open questions.  
 
First, there is the problem of defining, quantifying and aggregating animal welfare. There are 
obvious connections here to the problem of defining, quantifying and aggregating human 
well-being in the philosophy of psychology (see, e.g., Alexandrova 2012). In both cases, we 
confront similar challenges. How do we respect the need to make animal welfare objective 
and empirically tractable while also doing justice to its normative value, and to its subjective, 
first-person character? Animal welfare scientists often invoke the concept of coping: good 
welfare is said to consist in successful coping with the environment, where coping involves 
“control of mental and bodily stability” (Broom and Johnson 1993). Defenders of such 
accounts maintain that coping is, on the one hand, empirically measurable, while being, on 
the other hand, a normatively valuable property that captures welfare’s subjective and 
internal aspects. But there is room for further debate here, and these qualitative definitions 
still leave open the question of how welfare should be quantified in particular cases, and how 






Second, there is the problem of understanding how the cognitive capacities of an animal 
causally influence its welfare. The case of pain is an easy case in this respect: it is obvious 
that pain bears negatively on welfare. The case of cognitive enrichment is a harder case. It is 
intuitive to suppose that engagement in a stimulating task is conducive to good welfare, 
whereas the stress of failing a task or the boredom of completing an unchallenging task are 
not. Yet there is a danger here of a form of evaluative anthropomorphism—a projection of 
our own values on to animals—that is distinct from the cognitive anthropomorphism often 
involved in over-attributing mental capacities. Might it be, for example, that stress can 
sometimes generate welfare benefits in captive animals, due to its role in facilitating 
learning? This suggestion (discussed by Meehan and Mench 2007) may seem 
counterintuitive, but it should not be dismissed out of hand. More generally, as we turn to 
more complex mental capacities studied by comparative psychologists—such as theory of 
mind, long-term memory, causal reasoning and reasoning about the future—the likely 
welfare implications of attributing (or misattributing) these capacities become increasingly 
difficult to discern, in the absence of a richer theoretical understanding of the nature and 
causes of good psychological welfare in animals. 
 
In sum, an expected welfare maximization framework tells us how a theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between an animal’s cognitive capacities and its welfare 
should inform judgements of the burden of proof for mental state attributions, in the context 
of formulating animal welfare policy. But I freely acknowledge that this leaves us with much 
of the hard work—the work of better understanding the causal pathways linking cognition to 
welfare—still to do. The imperative to maximize expected welfare provides an abstract 
framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof for the attribution of mental states, 
provided we understand how those mental states, if present, affect welfare. But with some 
exceptions, such as the case of pain, that understanding is currently lacking.  
 
This short paper should not, therefore, be regarded as solving the problems it raises. Its main 
contribution is to show why a deeper theoretical understanding of the relationship between 
animal cognition and animal welfare is urgently needed, if we are to set appropriate burdens 
of proof for mental state attributions to animals in policymaking contexts. 
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